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ABSTRACT
We review evidence that long lines waiting to vote in the 2012 presidential election were costly and dis-
proportionately appeared in certain regions of the country, in cities, and among minority voters. We
argue that the field of queuing theory helps to frame thinking about polling place lines. Because addressing
the problem of long lines requires precise data about polling place dynamics, we conclude by suggesting
new approaches to research that are necessary to identify the most effective cure for long lines.
Waiting in line to vote
1 is the most visible
sign of administrative frictions of managing
elections. The visibility of long lines makes them
a convenient symbol for those who seek to improve
election administration. However, absent compre-
hensive, reliable information about lines—where
they appear, who endures them, and strategies to
mitigate them—it is easy to flail at the problem
without making much progress. In this article, we
lay the groundwork with some evidence about
where long lines occur and what is thought to
cause them. We emphasize four points:
First, long lines are costly.
Second, long lines are not universal.
Third, the field of queuing theory helps frame
thinking about polling place lines.
Fourth, new approaches to empirical research in
polling places are needed to identify the most
effective cures for long lines.
THE COSTS OF LINES
Long lines present three categories of problems
in American elections: they discourage voting,
lower voter confidence, and impose economic
costs on voters.
First, long lines discourage some from voting.
Responses to the 2012 Voting and Registration Sup-
plement (VRS) of the Current Population Survey
suggest that over 500,000 eligible voters failed to
vote because of a list of polling place problems
that include long lines—inconvenient hours or poll-
ing place location, or lines too long.
Second, long lines reduce voter confidence in
elections. Responses to the Survey of the Perform-
ance of America Elections (SPAE) suggest that
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1This article makes use of data from the Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Study (CCES) and the Survey of the Perform-
ance of American Elections (SPAE). Ansolabehere and
Stewart are the principal investigators of the CCES and
SPAE, respectively. The SPAE was undertaken with the finan-
cial support of the Pew Charitable Trusts, which bears no
responsibility for the analysis contained herein. Both the
CCES and SPAE are Internet surveys and both ask an identical
question concerning the amount of time voters waited at the
polls. In 2012, the CCES interviewed 54,535 adults, 39,675
of whom voted; the SPAE interviewed 10,200 registered voters,
9,336 of whom voted. The CCES asks fewer questions about
election administration, but has a larger sample size that is dis-
tributed across the nation in proportion to population. The
SPAE focuses its questions entirely on election administration,
with a smaller sample size distributed within states in propor-
tion to population. Depending on the nature of the analysis,
one survey will be more appropriate to use than the other.
In some cases, specifically estimating waiting times within
states, we can combine the two surveys to create more precise
estimates.
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waiting a long time to vote reduces the confidence
voters have that their votes are counted. For
instance, among Election Day voters in 2012, 68%
of those who waited ten minutes or less to vote sta-
ted they were very confident their vote was counted
as intended, compared to 47% of voters who waited
over an hour.2 Moreover, voters who themselves
experienced long lines were also less likely to
believe that votes in their county, their state, and
nationwide were counted as intended (Stewart and
Ansolabehere 2013, Table 1).
Third, long lines impose monetary costs on vot-
ers. A simple way to produce a ballpark estimate
of monetary costs is to multiply the total number
of hours waiting in line by average hourly earnings
in 2012, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Doing so yields an estimated economic
cost of $544.4 million in election line-waiting in
2012, which is about one-fifth the budget of local
election offices in 2012 (Stewart and Ansolabehere,
pp. 4–5).
BASIC FACTS ABOUT LINES
We now turn to the evidence about who waits in
line, and how long they wait, using answers to two
major academic surveys, the Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Study (CCES) and the SPAE.
Relying on responses to the 2008 and 2012
CCES, Table 1 reports the distribution of responses
to the question, ‘‘Approximately, how long did you
have to wait in line to vote?’’
Most voters in the past two general elections did
not wait very long to vote. Roughly one-third report
not waiting at all, and roughly two-thirds report
waiting ten minutes or less.
For those who wait more than one hour, the waits
can be quite long. Among those waiting more than
an hour in these two presidential elections, the aver-
age reported wait time was 109 minutes in 2008 and
110 minutes in 2012.
The factor that is associated with the biggest
differences in wait times is the voter’s state of resi-
dence. According to estimates derived by combin-
ing responses to the CCES and SPAE, average
wait times in 2012 ranged from 1.5 minutes in Ver-
mont to 39.2 minutes in Florida. The table in
Appendix A reports the state estimates, along with
95% margins of error. Regionally, the shortest wait-
ing times tend to occur in the western half of the
country and in the northeast, while the longest
waits tend to occur in the lower eastern seaboard.
Waiting times also vary within states. In Florida,
for instance, average estimated wait times range
from 5.7 minutes in Marion County (Ocala) to
136.6 minutes in Lee County (Ft. Myers).3
The great variation across states suggests there
are state-specific factors, such as laws, regulations,
and state norms, which influence how long voters
wait to vote.4 The great variation within states sug-
gests that there is further influence of demographics
and local administrative practices in determining
line lengths at the polls.
State wait times are also persistent. There is
remarkable consistency in wait times at the state
level, comparing 2008 and 2012. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, where we plot the average wait time by
state in 2012 along the y-axis, and the 2008 average
along the x-axis. (The axis scales are logarithmic,
which aids in the legibility of the individual data
points.) States with long wait times in 2012 gener-
ally had long wait times in 2008. With some excep-
tions, if one wanted to predict which states would
have long wait times in 2012, the best place to
start would be to identify those states with long
wait times in 2008.
State persistence is important for thinking about
how to tackle the problem of long lines. In the
wake of the long lines in 2012, many commentators
and election officials pointed out factors that were
unique to the 2012 election as the causes. The
Table 1. Average Waiting Times to Vote, 2008 and 2012
2008 2012
Not at all 36.8% 37.3%
Less than 10 minutes 27.6% 31.8%
10–30 minutes 19.0% 18.4%
31–60 minutes 10.3% 8.6%
More than one hour 6.3% 3.9%
Average (min.) 16.7 13.3
95% margin of error (min.) 0.1 0.1
N 18,836 30,124
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), 2008 and
2012.
2See Sances and Stewart 2014. In a multivariate statistical anal-
ysis that adds controls for partisanship and state of residence of
the voter, the relationship reported here, between voter confi-
dence and wait times, remains.
3The 95% confidence intervals are 1.6 minutes for Marion
County and 11.4 minutes for Lee County.
4See Stein and Vonnahme (2014).
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best example is Florida, which saw significant
changes in its election law which, in hindsight,
seem ripe to have caused longer lines at the polls,
such as cutting the early voting period significantly
and lengthening the text on the ballot to describe
referenda. If these are the explanations for Florida’s
long lines in 2012, what is the explanation for Flor-
ida’s long lines in 2008, when they were not factors?
Long lines are also unevenly distributed demo-
graphically, as the following statistics, drawn from
the CCES, illustrate:5
1. Mode of voting. Early voters in 2012 waited
an average of 18 minutes, compared to 12
minutes for Election Day voters.6
2. Race of voters.Minority voters waited longer
to vote than white voters in 2012. White vot-
ers waited an average of 12 minutes to vote,
compared to 24 minutes for African Ameri-
can voters and 19minutes for Hispanic voters.
3. Population density. Voters in densely popu-
lated neighborhoods wait longer to vote
than voters from sparsely populated areas.
Respondents to the CCES who lived in the
least densely populated ZIP Codes waited
an average of 6 minutes to vote, compared
to 18 minutes for residents of the most
densely populated ZIP Codes.7
QUEUING THEORY AND ELECTION LINES
The scientific discipline that analyzes the general
problem of waiting in line is queuing theory, taught
at business and engineering schools throughout the
country.8 In its simplest expression, queuing theory
can be applied to the problem of long lines at the
poll. Unfortunately, only a handful of professional
students of queuing, from academia or the business
world, have attacked the issue of queuing in the con-
text of elections.9
Using a simple set of mathematical tools, knowl-
edge about the design of the system (e.g., how many
service stations are in place) and assumptions or
knowledge about inputs (e.g., how frequently new
customers arrive), it is possible to predict ahead of
time quantities such as the average wait in the
queue, the average length of the queue, and the
number of customers the system can handle in a
given unit of time.
Queuing models that assume there is a single
bottleneck in voting—either at the check-in table
or the voting booth—have motivated the two
most direct applications of queuing theory to the
issue of polling places—studies by Allen and
Bernshteyn and by Edelstein and Edelstein that
were cited above. These studies have provided an
analysis of waiting times in Franklin County (Co-
lumbus), Ohio, in light of the allocation of equip-
ment to precincts (Allen and Bernshteyn) and a
FIG. 1. Average wait time at the state level, 2012 and 2008.
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)
and the Survey of the Performance of American Elections
(SPAE), 2012.
5Full multivariate analysis associated with this series of bivari-
ate relationships may be seen at Stewart and Ansolabehere
(2013, appendix 2).
6This difference remains when we control for the state in which
the respondent lives. Also see Stein and Vonnahme (2014).
7This analysis was performed, first, by merging population den-
sity data to the CCES, using ZIP Code, and then dividing the
sample into equally populated quarters, or quartiles. Respond-
ents from the least densely populated areas lived in ZIP
Codes with a population density of 75 persons per square
mile or less. Residents from the most densely populated areas
lived in ZIP Codes with a population density of 2,739 persons
per square mile or more. This is related to Kimball and Bay-
beck’s (2013) findings concerning jurisdiction size and election
administration.
8A (relatively) accessible introduction to queuing theory may
be found in Chapter 4 of the online version of Larson and
Ondoni (1981), available at <http://web.mit.edu/urban_or_
book/www/book/chapter4/contents4.html> .
9But see Allen and Bernshteyn (2006); Edelstein and Edelstein
(2010); Olabisi and Chukwunoso (2012); Yang et al. (2012);
Yang et al. (2009); Belenky and Larson (2006); Samuelson
et al. (2007); Yang et al. (2014); Buell (2013).
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method for allocating voting machines to precincts
(Edelstein and Edelstein).
Research papers such as these are a promising
start of the application of queuing theory to the
field of election administration. Still, the actual
complexity of even the simplest polling site is
much greater than what has generally been mod-
eled to date. Most importantly, three major services
are provided at each polling place, not one: check-
ing in (including verifying one’s identity and
receiving the proper ballot), marking the ballot,
and submitting the ballot for counting. Thus,
even at its simplest, the typical in-person voting
station (either Election Day or early) should be
described using a figure such as the one in Figure
2, in which the issue is not managing one queue,
but three related queues, in which departures
from one feed the next.
A fundamental observation that emerges from
Figure 2 is the potential cascading of problems
‘‘downstream.’’ For instance, a delay in scanning
ballots, which is part of submitting ballots at the
end of the process, can produce a long line of people
with marked ballots who wish to leave the polling
place, but can’t. This, in turn, can lead managers of
the polling station to restrict access to check-in, to
preserve order at the voting booths and the check-
out tables. Lines accumulate at the door, even though
the bottleneck is at the end of the process.
One useful tool for exploring the interactive
effect of the multiple bottlenecks at the polling
place is a simulation program developed by Mark
Pelczarski, originally for use by the 2012 Obama
campaign, an updated version which was posted
on the website of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technol-
ogy Project in the hopes that tools such as this could
help local officials allocate their election resources
more effectively.10 Such tools take as inputs data
that election officials usually have at their finger-
tips, such as the number of check-in stations and
voting booths at each precinct, and information
they can easily estimate, such as how long it takes
to check-in or cast a ballot, and estimate average
wait times at precincts, given the input parameters.
MITIGATING LONG LINES
All of the strategies to mitigate long lines can be
thought of in terms of the simple queuing theory
schematic sketched in Figure 2. Leaving aside the
issues of ensuring that the capacities within the spe-
cific polling place service points are properly bal-
anced, and applying the ceteris paribus proviso,
lines will be lowered if (1) the number of voters
coming to a polling place is reduced, (2) the number
of service points is increased, or (3) average transac-
tion times are reduced. The following categorize
various policy proposals that have been put forward
as means to improve the problem of line lengths
under these topics.11
Reduce the number of voters coming
to the polling place
 Increase opportunities to vote by mail, thus
reducing the total number of people using all
forms of in-person voting.
 Increase opportunities to vote early in-person,
removing pressure from traditional precincts.
FIG. 2. Queuing in a polling place.
10 <http://web.mit.edu/vtp> . More pared down tools, developed
by Stephen Graves and Aaron Strauss, are also hosted on the
site.
11These proposals draw heavily on Levitt (2013). See the Levitt
article for a longer list of proposals than the one presented here.
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 Make Election Day a holiday, allowing for
arrival times to be smoothed out during the
day at traditional polling places.
Increase the number of service points
 Increase the number of precincts.
 Increase the number of poll workers.
 Increase the number of machines.
 Favor paper balloting over electronic voting
machines.
Reduce average transaction times
 Increase information to voters.
 Increase the functionality of electronic poll
books.
 Decrease the length of ballots.
Space is another constraint that is rarely high-
lighted, but in the context of trying to streamline
operations, it could be critical. Nearly all physical
polling places are located in repurposed space.
According to the 2012 SPAE, 32% of Election Day
voters voted in school buildings, 22% in churches,
and 16% in community centers, with the remaining
30% of voters using a hodgepodge of police/fire sta-
tions, libraries, stores, and private residences; for
early voting, 44% voted in government buildings
such as court houses and city halls, 16% in libraries,
and 14% in community centers. The important thing
to note is that these are not standardized spaces, and
it may not be possible to configure many of them
optimally to reduce service times.
Returning to the list of proposed solutions to
reduce the length of lines, it is important to reiterate
that very little empirical evidence has been produced
in the scholarly literature to demonstrate that imple-
menting them in the field will actually reduce lines.
The fact that there is only a tiny number of empirical
studies that examine correlations between the capac-
ity of individual polling places, on the one hand, and
voter experience, on the other, suggests the diffi-
culty in knowing precisely what it would take, in
terms of the expenditure of dollars for additional
equipment or the redistribution of existing equip-
ment, to mitigate the problems that do exist.
To help overcome the problem caused by a dearth
of policy-relevant empirical research aimed at fix-
ing the long-line problem, we identify two barriers
that must be overcome by researchers in this field.
First, there must be greater attention to detailed
analysis of polling place dynamics. Queueing the-
ory identifies the source of line-causing problems
in the transactions that occur at individual check-
in tables, voting machines, and ballot scanners.
Thus, the analysis must be at the point-of-service;
even analysis at the precinct-level may not be gran-
ular enough to diagnose and solve problems that
lead to long lines.
Second, there must be greater attention to actual
experimentation, in order to tell what works. The
observational data that are currently available—for
instance, the number of polling places deployed
across a county—are produced by very compli-
cated, interrelated decisions made by local election
officials. This means that the tools that might tradi-
tionally be used to study the ‘‘causes’’ of long lines
will be blunt instruments without very good mea-
sures of confounding effects measured at a highly
disaggregated level.
CONCLUSIONS
The previous section reviews a list of the most
common recommendations that have been proffered
as solutions to the problem of long lines. Unlike
post-2000, where research using existing data estab-
lished a clear pattern that relate the use of anti-
quated voting machines to increased ‘‘lost votes,’’
there is no single, high-impact solution to long
lines that emerges from existing research—and cer-
tainly nothing that seems to apply everywhere.
It seems undoubtedly true that, ceteris paribus, if
a state or locality were to reduce the number of vot-
ers coming to polling places, increase the number of
service points, and decrease transaction times, lines
would be shortened. However, the cost of these pro-
posals is unknown, and more to the point, the effect
of these proposals measured on a per-minute-re-
duced basis has yet to be quantified.
Therefore, while there may be some consensus
solutions to local and state problems with long lines,
much work still needs to be done to establish a basis
for making changes that may seem less obvious, or
for understanding trade-offs across competing values.
We conclude this article by making some observations
about how the required fact base might be established,
building off the evidence that already exists.
1. The ‘‘line problem’’ consists of two parts, chron-
ic long lines and long lines due to one-off events.
2. Chronic long lines appear to beset only a hand-
ful of states and counties. Research that compares
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states that are similar demographically, but which
have significantly different average wait times,
would advance our understanding of how laws and
practices facilitate expeditious service at polling pla-
ces. (A wide-ranging comparison of California and
Florida—states with similar demographics and bal-
lot lengths but dramatically different average wait
times—would seem the logical place to start.)
Even in states with short average waiting periods,
urban areas can still have long lines. Understanding
the chronic challenges of urban areas appears to be a
distinct area where more research is needed.
3. All jurisdictions can be prone to emergencies
that cause specific precincts to have long lines, and
all jurisdictions could be helped by gaining access
to better information about service times, to aid in a
process of continued improvement. The Election
Assistance Commission (EAC) and professional asso-
ciations are well positioned to facilitate the sharing of
best practices among election officials, as they cope
with the inevitable service crises on Election Day.
4. The EAC can provide a helpful role in support-
ing the research on voters’ experiences and the extent
and causes of line problems. It is within the EAC’s
mandate to report on the progress of state and local
election officials in improving the customer service
provided to voters in polling places, and to develop
resources on the management of lines that can assist
counties that have chronic line problems.
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APPENDIX A
Table A. Average Wait Times by State, 2008 and 2012
2008 2012 2008 2012
State Wait 95% m.o.e.a Wait 95% m.o.e.a Wait 95% m.o.e.a Wait 95% m.o.e.a
Alabama 21 5.5 10 2.4 Montana 6 2.1 12 5.2
Alaska 5 1.7 3 1.2 Nebraska 10 3.2 4 1.1
Arizona 15 4.5 8 2.9 Nevada 10 2.4 8 1.3
Arkansas 21 4.7 13 2.4 New Hampshire 6 1.7 11 2.2
California 11 2.6 7 0.8 New Jersey 7 1.5 5 0.7
Colorado 10 4.1 8 2.7 New Mexico 12 2.9 6 1.4
Connecticut 10 23. 7 1.6 New York 9 1.3 12 1.5
Delaware 12 3.2 4 1 North Carolina 19 2.9 13 1.4
D.C. 28 9.8 37 7.5 North Dakota 5 1.9 10 7.5
Florida 31 3.5 39 4 Ohio 19 2.7 10 1.3
Georgia 40 5.8 16 2 Oklahoma 22 4.9 17 2.7
Hawaii 5 1.6 7 2 Oregon na na na na
Idaho 6 1.8 8 1.9 Pennsylvania 14 1.7 8 1
Illinois 12 1.8 12 2.2 Rhode Island 5 2 11 2.2
Indiana 22 3.6 13 2.3 South Carolina 56 7.7 25 3.8
Iowa 5 1.5 6 1.8 South Dakota 4 1.7 3 1.2
Kansas 10 2.3 11 2 Tennessee 19 3.6 13 1.7
Kentucky 12 2.6 8 1.5 Texas 13 1.4 11 1.1
Louisiana 16 3.5 16 3 Utah 13 3.3 10 2
Maine 4 1.3 4 1.1 Vermont 2 1.2 2 0.7
Maryland 24 4.3 36 4 Virginia 28 4.6 25 2.5
Massachusetts 6 1.2 7 1.2 Washington na na na na
Michigan 20 3.5 19 2.3 West Virginia 14 3.4 11 2
Minnesota 9 2 6 1 Wisconsin 8 1.6 8 1.4
Mississippi 11 2.9 7 1.4 Wyoming 5 2 4 1.2
Missouri 20 3.7 11 1.8
Oregon and Washington are excluded because they are vote-by-mail states.
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and the Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPAE), 2008 and 2012.
aMargin of error.
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